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THE BANKRUPTCY EXCHANGE 
Douglas G. Baird* 
The bankruptcy forum has become a marketplace for claims.1 Those 
who made the loans are far removed from the players that sit at the 
negotiating table in the modern corporate reorganization. Instead of stock 
being traded on the floor of an exchange, claims are traded in bankruptcy 
court. Investors become residual owners of firms outside of bankruptcy by 
buying stock. Inside of bankruptcy they do it by buying debt. In both cases, 
it is a world of professional traders, arbitrageurs, and corporate raiders. 2 
Long passed is the time when we could usefully debate whether claims 
trading in bankruptcy was a good or a bad thing. We should accept that it 
has become a fundamental feature of bankruptcy. But it is naive to think 
that this new market, the bankruptcy exchange, should be unregulated. All 
markets are regulated. Whether one is a merchant who seeks to sell wool in 
the twelfth century or a farmer who wants to sell grain in the nineteenth, 
being subject to regulation is inevitable.3 One cannot set up a market 
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 1. See Stuart C. Gilson, Investing in Distressed Situations: A Market Survey, FIN. ANALYSTS 
J., Nov.–Dec. 1995, at 8; Adam J. Levitin, Jr., Finding Nemo: Rediscovering the Virtues of 
Negotiability in the Wake of Enron, 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 83, 86 (2007) (“Although the 
exact size of the corporate bankruptcy claims trading market is unknown, it was estimated to be in 
the hundreds of billions of dollars about a decade ago and has seen a prodigious growth in recent 
years.”). 
 2. See Michelle M. Harner, The Corporate Governance and Public Policy Implications of 
Activist Distressed Debt Investing, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 703, 703 (2008) (“Activist institutional 
investors traditionally have invested in a company’s equity to try to influence change at the 
company. Some of these investors, however, are now purchasing a company’s debt for this same 
purpose.”); see also Michelle M. Harner, Trends in Distressed Debt Investing: An Empirical Study 
of Investors’ Objectives, 16 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 69, 70 (2008) (“[P]rofessional distressed 
debt investors . . . . are purchasing positions in multiple tranches of the debtor’s capital structure, 
obtaining seats on the statutory committee of unsecured creditors and even acting as the debtor’s 
post-petition lender.”). 
  The market for claims against a distressed business also flourishes well in advance of a 
bankruptcy filing. In the recent Chrysler bankruptcy, for example, the Indiana pension funds that 
sought to block Chrysler’s sale had bought their secured debt for forty-three cents on the dollar 
nine months before the bankruptcy filing. Michael J. de la Merced, U.S. Court of Appeals Upholds 
Chrysler Sale to Fiat, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2009, at B2 (discussing In re Chrysler L.L.C., 576 F.3d 
108 (2d Cir. 2009)). 
 3. See, e.g., Munn v. Illinois (In re Munn), 94 U.S. 113, 135–36 (1877) (upholding state 
regulation of the storage and sale of grain); see also Richard O. Zerbe, Jr., The Origin and Effect 
of Grain Trade Regulations in the Late Nineteenth Century, 56 AGRIC. HIST. 172, 172 (1982) 
(“Business transactions of every sort take place within a regulatory context in the sense that there 
is a framework of law, custom, or culture which provides rules and structure to transactions.”). 
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without regulating it. Simply providing that it is open on Wednesdays, but 
not Saturdays, is a form of regulation that works to the advantage of some 
and to the disadvantage of others. The Chicago Board of Trade is the 
paradigm of a free market, but it is also among the world’s most heavily 
regulated. Elaborate rules establish who can trade, what can be sold, when 
trading can occur, and under what terms.4 
Regulation of the bankruptcy exchange is similarly inescapable. Every 
decision in a bankruptcy case affects the bankruptcy exchange, for better or 
worse. Scheduling a date for a cramdown hearing has the effect of putting 
an exercise date on an option contract. Whether intended or not, every 
decision a bankruptcy judge makes affects trading on the bankruptcy 
exchange. The question is not whether there should be regulation, but what 
form it should take. 
In this Article, I review the first principles that should be at work in 
regulating the bankruptcy exchange. Part I examines the features and the 
virtues of a well-functioning market and connects them to the trading of 
claims in bankruptcy. Parts II and III look more narrowly at the role the 
disclosure rules play. Disclosure rules are a crucial feature of the playing 
field in this market as in any other. At the medieval fair, goods for sale had 
to be on public display.5 On the Chicago Board of Trade, traders must, 
under some circumstances, disclose their trading positions (though only to 
the exchange, not to their contracting opposites).6 All markets have 
disclosure rules, and the bankruptcy exchange should not be an exception. 
Part II focuses on the disclosures needed for the rest of the bankruptcy 
process to work effectively, independent of the exchange itself. Part III 
focuses on the role that disclosure plays in ensuring a well-functioning 
market in bankruptcy claims. This part of the Article is the most tentative, 
because while one can set out basic principles, it is too soon to provide 
many clear lessons about the costs and benefits of maintaining transparency 
in the trading of bankruptcy claims. 
I. THE WELL-FUNCTIONING EXCHANGE 
Those who establish an exchange, whether medieval prince, Chicago 
merchant or bankruptcy judge, try to ensure that the market works while 
advancing their own agendas, whether it is raising taxes, promoting 
business, or rehabilitating firms. The rules that govern well-functioning 
markets share three features worth underscoring. First, they allow those 
who want to sell to do so at low cost and at a price that reflects the value of 
                                                                                                               
 4. See generally CHI. BD. OF TRADE, CHICAGO BOARD OF TRADE RULEBOOK, available at 
http://www.cmegroup.com/rulebook/cbot-rulebook-listing.html (last visited June 9, 2009). 
 5. See ELLEN WEDEMEYER MOORE, THE FAIRS OF MEDIEVAL ENGLAND: AN 
INTRODUCTORY STUDY 115 (Pontifical Inst. of Mediaeval Studies 1985). 
 6. See CHICAGO BOARD OF TRADE RULEBOOK, R. 561. 
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the assets that are being traded. Second, they ensure that assets will move to 
those who value them the most. Third (and less noted), they try to take best 
advantage of the information that a well-functioning market aggregates.7 
The price generated in such a market contains more reliable information 
than what you can find in the report of any expert.8 Even those who do not 
themselves trade can benefit from this information.9 
When a market is liquid, that is, when many are able to trade at low 
cost, the price at which assets are sold is likely to reflect its true value. This 
in turn attracts trade and lowers costs.10 Quite apart from transaction costs, 
someone who is confident that a market is working can worry less about 
strategic behavior. Moreover, the average trader can sell at the current price 
without doing elaborate research. The research is unnecessary as the 
information it would uncover is already embedded in the market price. 
Trading done by those who already have the information in a liquid market 
has this effect.11 
The ordinary, uninformed outsider can invest in the stock market by 
acquiring a diversified portfolio and be confident that, at least over the long 
run, she will enjoy a market return on her investment.12 A well-functioning 
bankruptcy exchange serves a similar function. Unsophisticated small 
creditors, whether they are suppliers, tort victims, or small investors, can 
opt out of the bankruptcy process early and liquidate their claims. 
One must, of course, make an important caveat: To say that a well-
functioning bankruptcy exchange has these virtues is not to say that claims 
trading in any particular bankruptcy works well. When the market for 
claims is thin, inaccessible, or laden with transaction costs, the prices at 
which claims trade may have no relationship to their true value. While a 
well-functioning market brings an enormous benefit to tort victims, one that 
works poorly can be worse than none at all. The unsophisticated creditors 
who trade, receive far less for their claims than they are worth. They are not 
knowledgeable enough to know that they should hold on to their claims.13 
                                                                                                               
 7. See, e.g., Justin Wolfers & Eric Zitzewitz, Prediction Markets, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 107, 
113 (2004) (evidence illustrates that the Hollywood Stock Exchange has been almost as accurate 
as experts in picking Oscar winners). 
 8. Id. 
 9. See id. 
 10. See Fischer Black, Noise, 41 J. FIN. 529, 532 (1986). 
 11. See generally Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and 
Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970). 
 12. See generally BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET (1973) 
(advocating a passive, indexing strategy toward investing); HARRY M. MARKOWITZ, PORTFOLIO 
SELECTION: EFFICIENT DIVERSIFICATION OF INVESTMENTS (1959) (providing the mathematical 
foundation for portfolio selection). 
 13. For the classic analysis of claims trading, see Chaim J. Fortgang & Thomas Moers Mayer, 
Trading Claims and Taking Control of Corporations in Chapter 11, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 
(1990). For an early and forceful exposition of the virtues of disclosure, see Joy Flowers Conti, 
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Of course, one cannot expect prices to track true values precisely, even 
in the most well-functioning market.14 As a matter of theory, it is simply not 
possible for the two to match. The prices on an exchange can reflect 
information only if those who possess it are able to profit by trading on it. 
They have to believe there is a gap between the true value and the market 
price or they will not have an incentive to trade. Quite apart from theory, 
experience has taught us that prices are inevitably noisy.15 Fischer Black’s 
test for whether a market was working well was whether an asset trades at a 
price that is within fifty percent of its true value.16 
In short, while searching to improve its regulation, one should not 
expect too much of the bankruptcy exchange. Even under the best of 
circumstances, prices on the exchange will be volatile. The best we can do 
is minimize the volatility and try to ensure that the price at which a claim is 
sold is an unbiased estimate of its actual value, where the price is as likely 
to be too high as too low. 
A well-functioning market is one of the best ways to aggregate 
information. The best estimate of the price at which grain will sell next 
October is the price generated on the futures exchange today. Such 
knowledge is valuable not simply to the people who buy and sell on the 
exchange, but also to the farmer who must decide whether to plant wheat 
and to the bakery that must decide whether to expand. Indeed, markets are 
so effective at aggregating information that sometimes we create 
information markets solely for this purpose. For example, prediction 
markets do far better than any expert in predicting the outcome of the 
presidential election or the next winner of an Academy award.17 
It might seem that this feature of well-functioning markets could be 
harnessed in the bankruptcy process. Assume, for example, that a firm has 
creditors owed a total of $100 and all of it is unsecured. Let us also assume 
that the plan of reorganization will give one share of equity for each dollar 
of claim. The price at which each claim trades today multiplied by one 
hundred tells us how much the firm is worth. 
                                                                                                               
Raymond F. Kozlowski, Jr. & Leonard S. Ferleger, Claims Trafficking In Chapter 11—Has The 
Pendulum Swung Too Far?, 9 BANKR. DEV. J. 281, 349 (1992). For an incisive look at claims 
trading in bankruptcy, see Frederick Tung, Confirmation and Claims Trading, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 
1684, 1701–03 (1996). 
 14. See Black, supra note 10, at 531 (noise trading is necessary for the market to function). 
Indeed, Black showed that without such valuation uncertainty, securities markets could not even 
exist. Id. For him, a market was efficient if the price at which a security traded is somewhere 
between half and twice its true value. Id. at 533 (factor of two arbitrary values Black uses to 
define an efficient market). 
 15. See, e.g., G. William Schwert, Stock Market Volatility, FIN. ANALYSTS J., May–June 1990, 
at 23, 23. 
 16. Black, supra note 10, at 533. 
 17. Wolfers & Zitzewitz, supra note 7, at 112–13. 
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One should, however, be quick to note the limitations of our ability to 
use or extract information from this market, even when it functions well. A 
judge cannot, for example, use the price at which claims trade to put a value 
on the firm. When the judge is putting a value on the firm, the price at 
which claims trade is not an estimate of the value of the firm, but rather a 
best estimate of the value the judge will place on it. If the judge follows the 
market price at the same time those who trade in the market are following 
the judge, they will simply be chasing each other’s tails. 
Nevertheless, the bankruptcy exchange can still provide information. 
The bankruptcy judge and other players can usefully extract information 
from the prices at which claims trade. Among other things, they provide 
warning signals. Consider, for example, the case in which there is a hard 
cash offer for the firm and a plan of reorganization that the debtor has put 
forward. The judge must pick between the two. If the value of the firm 
derived from the bankruptcy exchange is less than the cash offer, one must 
at least ask whether the market is reflecting the possibility that the judge 
will accept that plan and that the plan is worth less than the hard cash offer. 
Of course, one must be confident both that the market is thick enough for 
prices to capture information and that the hard cash offer is indeed hard, but 
such information can be a useful signal. 
The general features of a well-functioning market are understood. The 
basic idea is to encourage trade. The more fragmented the market and the 
more diverse the underlying assets that are bought and sold, the less likely 
the market will work effectively. The perennial challenge facing the 
Chicago Board of Trade is defining the underlying contract for the 
commodities that are bought and sold.18 If the definition of “corn” is too 
broad and allows for too much variation in the type of corn, sellers can act 
strategically and deliver corn of the low quality and still meet the contract. 
High-quality corn will become debased or disappear from the market 
altogether. But if “corn” is defined too narrowly, there will be too little 
trading. The price will not capture information as effectively and the 
contract itself can become subject to manipulation, such as the risk of a 
corner.19 
The bankruptcy exchange also requires that claims be defined in a way 
that allows trading at low cost. The basic way in which the Bankruptcy 
Code treats claims does exactly this. The Bankruptcy Code converts all 
unsecured debts into a general claim against the firm, regardless of the 
                                                                                                               
 18. See WILLIAM CRONON, NATURE’S METROPOLIS: CHICAGO AND THE GREAT WEST 132 
(1992) (standard grades eliminated worries about the quality of grain in futures, but created the 
possibility of corners). 
 19. See id. at 127–32 (discussing corners on the Chicago Board of Trade in the nineteenth 
century). 
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debt’s duration and interest rate.20 Debentures with different interest rates, 
different covenants and different maturity dates outside of bankruptcy trade 
become homogenized in bankruptcy, while many of their non-bankruptcy 
attributes are washed away.21 As any commodity becomes more fungible, it 
becomes easier to trade. Hence, facilitating claims trading ought to be 
counted among the justifications for this homogenization of disparate 
claims. 
For the same reason, the widespread understanding that all claims with 
the same legal attributes must be put in the same class also facilitates 
trade.22 Some, including me, have criticized the rule on the ground that a 
supplier owed money and a bank might have radically different perspectives 
on a plan of reorganization.23 Hence, lumping them together might neglect 
the rights of some of the affected groups. But whatever benefit might arise 
from having multiple classes must be weighed against the cost to the 
bankruptcy exchange. The greater the diversity among the voting rights 
attached to claims, the thinner the market for them will be. 
The need to ensure a well-functioning market in claims provides an 
additional justification for Justice Holmes’s opinion in Sexton v. Dreyfuss.24 
In that case, Justice Holmes held that the attributes of every claim against 
the debtor are fixed at the time of the filing of the petition.25 The filing of 
the bankruptcy petition is a day of reckoning that “collapses all future 
probabilities to present values.”26 We take a snapshot of every claim on that 
day and the characteristics of the claim on that date remain throughout the 
case.27 No one can be made the holder in due course of a negotiable 
instrument after a bankruptcy petition is filed.28 A claim subject to 
                                                                                                               
 20. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (2006) (defining “claim” for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code as 
generally any “right to payment”). 
 21. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(2) (2006) (disallowing claims for unmatured interest). 
 22. 11 U.S.C. § 1122(a) (2006). 
 23. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, THE ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 259–60 (4th ed. 2006). 
 24. 219 U.S. 339 (1911). 
 25. Id. at 345. The principle has been reaffirmed many times over the decades. See, e.g., 
United States v. Marxen, 307 U.S. 200, 207 (1939) (“[T]he rights of creditors are fixed by the 
Bankruptcy Act as of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy.”); In re Groenleer-Vance Furniture 
Co., 23 F. Supp. 713, 715 (W.D. Mich. 1938) (“[T]he rights of creditors become fixed at the 
moment of bankruptcy and . . . they then acquire a right in rem against the assets.”); Swarts v. 
Siegel, 117 F. 13, 15 (8th Cir. 1902) (“The rights of creditors are fixed by the status of their claims 
when the petition in bankruptcy is filed.”). 
 26. Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Control Rights, Priority Rights, and the 
Conceptual Foundations of Corporate Reorganizations, 87 VA. L. REV. 921, 936 (2001). 
 27. A conspicuous exception arises if a creditor holding a claim engages in bad conduct during 
the bankruptcy case and thus subjects the claim to subordination. See 11 U.S.C. § 510(c)(1) (2006) 
(giving the bankruptcy court power to subordinate claims “under principles of equitable 
subordination”); see also Benjamin v. Diamond (In re Mobile Steel Co.), 563 F.2d 692, 699–700 
(5th Cir. 1977) (explaining the required conditions for equitable subordination). 
 28. A bankruptcy petition constitutes notice of the debtor’s default. Hence, “[o]nce the issuer 
of a negotiable instrument files a bankruptcy petition, no buyer of the instrument can be a holder 
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subordination at the moment the bankruptcy petition is filed should, by this 
logic, similarly remain subject to subordination no matter how many times 
it is transferred subsequently.29 The character of a claim should not change 
no matter who is holding it. 
But while these longstanding bankruptcy rules facilitate the creation of 
the bankruptcy exchange, a number of new developments threaten to 
undermine it. As I have pointed out elsewhere, novel capital structures 
create an anti-commons problem.30 Instead of a firm with a dispersed group 
of holders of homogenous general claims against the firm, we increasingly 
see more complicated structures.31 There may be second liens and 
subordinated creditors in addition to general creditors.32 In a large case, 
secured creditors of a parent company may be structurally subordinated to 
the general creditors of the operating company subsidiary. A single bank is 
the record holder of a particular claim, but many individuals may hold the 
economic interest through total return swaps and other devices.33 
The fragmentation we see today may make it hard for a market in 
claims to come into being, even if everyone knows exactly who holds 
which claim. Forming a plan of reorganization is analogous to the problem 
facing the developer who wants to assemble a city block and build a 
skyscraper on it: The more dispersed and convoluted the various freehold 
and leasehold interests, the harder it is for the city block to be used 
effectively or a value to be placed on any of them.34 Bankruptcy is no 
different over this dimension. 
                                                                                                               
in due course because the buyer will be on notice that the instrument is overdue.” LAWRENCE P. 
KING ET AL., 6 COLLIER BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE GUIDE ¶ 94.03[2][a][i] (Chaim J. Fortgang & 
Thomas Moers Mayer eds., 15th ed. rev. 2005). 
 29. This was vigorously and inconclusively contested in the Enron litigation. Enron Corp. v. 
Ave. Special Situations Fund II, L.P. (In re Enron Corp.), 333 B.R. 205 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005), 
vacated and remanded, 379 B.R. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). The opposing argument is likewise 
premised upon the need to promote the trading of claims. One can argue that to promote the 
bankruptcy exchange, negotiability primes other considerations. Hence, doctrines such as 
equitable subordination should attach only to the party that engages in bad conduct, not to 
subsequent good faith purchasers. See Levitin, supra note 1, for a lucid discussion. 
 30. See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Anti-Bankruptcy, 119 YALE L.J. 
(forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 6), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=1396827. 
 31. Id. (manuscript at 3–4). 
 32. See id. (manuscript at 25–28) (discussing second lien loans). 
 33. See id. (manuscript at 39). 
 34. See generally Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the 
Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998); see also Lee Anne Fennell, 
Commons, Anticommons, Semicommons, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF 
PROPERTY LAW (Kenneth M. Ayotte & Henry E. Smith eds., forthcoming 2009), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1348267; MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: HOW TOO 
MUCH OWNERSHIP WRECKS MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION, AND COSTS LIVES (2008). 
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II. DISCLOSURE AND THE BANKRUPTCY PROCESS 
Before we reach the question of how much transparency is desirable or 
necessary to create a well-functioning exchange, we first need to recognize 
that there is some need for disclosure in order to ensure the smooth 
functioning of the bankruptcy process as a whole. The bankruptcy judge 
needs information about claims and those who hold them to administer the 
case effectively. A judge must make her decisions on the basis of what 
interested parties tell her. Advocates cannot engage in any 
misrepresentations, but they do not have to make the other side’s argument 
for them. To decide sensibly, the judge must take into account that she is 
listening to advocates and draw inferences from what they do and do not 
say. 
In theory, the judge should be able to do this when multiple advocates 
are before her, as long as at least one of them has the incentive to disclose 
the relevant information.35 In contrast to many judicial forums, however, the 
bankruptcy judge is often forced to decide questions when only some of the 
interested parties are before her. Sometimes only the moving party is in 
court. Motions are filed and no one files an objection. “GNO” is the 
marginal note most often scribbled on the bankruptcy judge’s motion 
calendar—grant if no objection. 
Deciding matters effectively in such an environment requires drawing 
inferences from what is being said and who is saying it. The bankruptcy 
judge is likely to look much differently at a motion to provide adequate 
protection blessed by a large general creditor, from the way she looks at it 
when the same creditor says nothing. She draws the reasonable inference 
that the order makes sense when someone who ultimately bears its costs 
supports it. She assumes that this party has reviewed the risks, even those 
that might not be readily apparent. 
But drawing inferences from self-interested advocates may require 
knowing where the advocates are coming from, especially when only a 
limited number of them appear. When an investor who holds a general 
claim against the estate also holds an even larger slice of the secured debt, 
her willingness to bless the adequate protection order means much less. 
Hence, independent of what disclosures are needed to promote the 
bankruptcy exchange, it may make sense to require anyone who appears in 
front of the bankruptcy judge to disclose their position, regardless of 
whether they serve on a committee.36 
                                                                                                               
 35. For an analysis of decision making in such contexts, see Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, 
Relying on the Information of Interested Parties, 17 RAND J. ECON. 18, 19 (1986). 
 36. Bankruptcy Rule 2019 requires certain disclosures from creditors serving on a committee 
other than the official creditors committee, but there is no general disclosure rule. FED. R. BANKR. 
P. 2019. 
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Disclosure, at least of a limited kind, may also be necessary because of 
the plan formation process. When the firm can be sold as a going concern, 
the plan of reorganization may involve little more than dividing the cash. 
But a going-concern sale does not always serve the interests of the 
stakeholders. Precisely because there is a liquid market in claims, those who 
are now participating in the bankruptcy process are already those who value 
the firm most highly. They prefer a reorganization in which they emerge as 
the owners of the business. They will receive less value from outsiders if 
they seek to sell the firm because they possess insider information. If they 
try to sell the firm, outsiders will infer that the private information they 
possess is bad. There is a standard “lemons” problem.37 They are better off 
negotiating among themselves rather than trying to sell it. 
In such cases, negotiations are the lifeblood of the bankruptcy process, 
and the plan formation process is often complicated. The governing rules 
should make these negotiations easier. This may require disclosure, at least 
as to who owns what. It is hard to forge a consensual plan if you do not 
know with whom you should be bargaining. The general principle here is 
clear: The easier it is to find the stakeholders, the more likely a sensible 
plan of reorganization can emerge. The core idea here is a familiar one seen 
in many other environments. The better defined the property rights, the 
more valuable they are. Land becomes more valuable when its owner and 
its boundaries are easy to identify from public records.38 Quite apart from 
whether I want to buy or sell land, I can use my own land more effectively 
if it is easy for me to learn who my neighbors are. Put simply, knowing the 
identity of the holders of property rights is a key assumption of Coasean 
bargaining.39 
III. DISCLOSURE AND THE BANKRUPTCY EXCHANGE 
Certain types of disclosure are necessary so that the market for claims 
functions effectively. The amount of disclosure needed to ensure a well-
                                                                                                               
 37. See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 489–90 (1970). Akerlof suggests that used cars are sold for 
unusually low prices because buyers fear that their sellers are selling only because the car is a 
“lemon.” Id. Given that those with good cars cannot sell them for their true value, they are 
inclined not to sell them. Id. Therefore, the pool of cars put up for sale falls in quality, depressing 
the price even more. At the limit, the market can collapse completely. Id. 
 38. See Gary D. Libecap & Dean Lueck, The Demarcation of Land and the Role of 
Coordinating Institutions (Int’l Ctr. for Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14, 2009), available 
at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1436986. 
 39. Potential distortions of the plan formation process lie at the heart of most critiques of Hu 
and Black, as well as Lubben, and the need they see for additional disclosure. See Henry T. C. Hu 
& Bernard Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling and Empty Voting II: Importance and Extensions, 
156 U. PA. L. REV. 625, 734 (2008) (“We believe that disclosure of coupled assets should become 
a routine part of bankruptcy proceedings.”); Stephen J. Lubben, Credit Derivatives and the Future 
of Chapter 11, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 405, 430 (2007). 
32 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 4 
functioning market is not obvious. All exchanges must have some 
mechanism for enforcing contracts and preventing fraud. Rules designed to 
ensure the solvency of those who trade on the exchange are also 
commonplace.40 By contrast, rules governing disclosure are far from self-
evident and vary widely. Trade-offs are inevitable. Put in place too few 
disclosure obligations, and those who trade are forced into endless games of 
twenty questions. There is much information in possession of the seller that 
sophisticated buyers insist on knowing before they are willing to trade. But 
sellers will not answer every question and sophisticated buyers will not 
insist on it.41 Too many disclosure obligations discourage traders from 
gathering valuable information in the first place.42 Everyone else suffers 
because the prices do not take account of the information and thus do not 
reflect the underlying value of the asset. Perhaps because of this tension, 
clear benchmarks have not emerged.43 
Consider the following case:44 The geologists for a mining company 
discover a vast mineral deposit on farmland in Canada. After the discovery, 
the company decides to repurchase a large amount of its own stock. Two 
disclosure issues present themselves. First, does the mining company have 
to disclose the existence of the mineral deposits to the Canadian farmers 
when they seek to acquire the mineral rights? Second, does it have to 
disclose the existence of the mineral deposits to the Wall Street investors 
when it tries to repurchase the stock? The answer to both questions under 
existing law is plain. The firm is free to hire intermediaries and buy up the 
mineral rights from the naïve farmers without disclosure as long as it does 
not engage in lies or misrepresentations,45 but it must disclose the existence 
                                                                                                               
 40. See, e.g., CHI. BD. OF TRADE, CHICAGO BOARD OF TRADE RULEBOOK, R. 820, 824, 
available at http://www.cmegroup.com/rulebook/cbot-rulebook-listing.html (last visited June 9, 
2009) (providing the Clearing House with the power to adjust terms of performance bonds as 
conditions change). 
 41. The proliferation of “big boy letters” evidences that sophisticated parties do not insist on 
complete disclosure, even when they know that their contracting opposites possess material, 
nonpublic information. See Daniel Sullivan, Comment, Big Boys and Chinese Walls, 75 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 533, 537 (2008). 
 42. HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 159, 165–66 (1966) 
(arguing that insider trading laws reduce incentives for investing in information about firm value); 
see also Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. 
LEG. STUD. 1 (1978) (explaining common law disclosure duties with this idea). 
 43. For illustrations of competing views on disclosure rules, see Frank H. Easterbrook & 
Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669 
(1984) and John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory 
Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717 (1984). 
 44. The facts in this illustration are based on SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d 
Cir. 1968). 
 45. See Laidlaw v. Organ, 15 U.S. 178, 195 (1817) (holding that contracting party had no duty 
to disclose material fact – in this case, the end of the War of 1812 to a stranger on the other end of 
the bargain); Harris v. Tyson, 24 Pa. 347, 359 (1855) (“A person who knows that there is a mine 
on the land of another may nevertheless buy it.”). 
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of the deposits to the sophisticated investors before it proceeds with its plan 
to repurchase the stock.46 Whether either disclosure rule makes sense or 
whether there is a sensible way to justify the different duties has long been 
a source of controversy with respect to commercial transactions generally 
and the trading of securities.47 But the example itself shows both the range 
of approaches and an absence of obvious overarching principles. 
Other things being equal, disclosure of information is good. One wants 
the price to reflect underlying values, but only if the information about the 
underlying value is known can it be incorporated into the market price. Yet, 
the issue is more complicated than it first seems. The need for disclosure in 
a liquid market is far less than it appears. Indeed, when the markets are 
thick enough, information can remain private and still be reflected in the 
market price. The trading activity of those with knowledge drives the price. 
It is enough that those with knowledge trade (and are known to trade). In 
equilibrium, the information that only knowledgeable insiders possess 
becomes embedded (with some noise) in the market price.48 
Consider the simplest case, in which outsiders can observe the trading 
behavior of someone who is known to possess inside information and can 
see the price at which this trader is indifferent between buying and selling, 
but nothing else. Imagine ten black boxes with an identical, but undisclosed 
amount of cash inside. One person in the room is allowed to look inside 
each box before it is sealed. The boxes are then offered for sale. The person 
who has looked inside the box will buy any box that is offered for less than 
twenty dollars and willingly sells to anyone who offers more than twenty 
dollars. What happens next? Even those who have never looked inside the 
box will be willing to buy them, and they will be able to sell them to others 
who have never looked inside. And in all cases the price will be about 
twenty dollars. Everyone will buy and trade at a price that reflects the inside 
information that only one person possesses. Someone who entered the room 
and bought a box would buy it at a price that reflected its true value. When 
the market is otherwise sufficiently liquid, disclosure requirements are not 
merely unnecessary, but are affirmatively harmful. We need to give the one 
person the incentive to look inside the box and then be in a position to profit 
when the price rises just above or falls just below twenty dollars. Disclosure 
mandates reduces the incentive to gather information in the first place and 
also reduces the incentive to trade on it.49 
                                                                                                               
 46. See Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 847–49, 851–52. The different treatment arises by 
virtue of Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2008). 
 47. See Kronman, supra note 42. 
 48. See Fama, supra note 11; Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of 
Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 565–79 (1984). 
 49. See, e.g., MANNE, supra note 42, at 159, 165–66. 
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Returning to the example of the mining company, if the legal regime 
forced the company to disclose what it knew about the mineral deposits 
before acquiring the mineral rights, it might never have spent the money 
hiring geologists to look for the deposits in the first place. Consequently, 
the minerals might never have been discovered. Rules aimed at ensuring 
transparency can actually create a less efficient market, one that is less 
liquid and in which prices fail to reflect underlying values. Both those with 
and without information are left worse off. 
For the trading of claims in bankruptcy, the lesson is a subtle one. On 
its face, there does not seem to be anyone in the position of the mining 
company and its team of geologists. Nor does it seem that the disclosures 
that are sometimes required—such as the price at which a hedge fund 
acquired a claim—have much to do with the underlying business.50 
Regardless of whether such disclosures do any affirmative good, they do 
not seem to do any harm. Indeed, attaching importance to the price at which 
someone bought a claim (which vulture investors routinely do) seems to be 
an example of the sunk-cost fallacy.51 If two investors have the same 
information about an asset, both should be willing to sell it at the same 
price, regardless of how much they paid for it. Both should maximize the 
value of whatever they hold today. 
The amount originally invested in an asset is a sunk cost. It should not 
be part of the decision calculus. In deciding how much to bet in a poker 
game, the number of chips in the pot that once were yours is irrelevant; 
once the money is in the middle of the table, it no longer belongs to you.52 
Good poker players (including many vulture investors who assert that the 
amount they paid for their claims matters enormously) know that you must 
ignore what you have bet and instead calculate the cost for you to continue 
playing against the value of the entire pot.53 A bankruptcy claim seems to 
be the same. You make the decision that promises to give you the most for 
your claim, regardless of whether you bought at twenty or at forty. You 
                                                                                                               
 50. See, e.g., In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 363 B.R. 701, 702 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) 
(requiring disclosure of purchase price for members of nonofficial committee under Rule 2019 of 
the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure). 
 51. For a discussion of the sunk cost fallacy, see Thomas Kelly, Sunk Costs, Rationality, and 
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 52. Annie Duke, The Sunk Costs of Trading, FIN. SPREAD BETTING – A TRADER’S GUIDE, 
http://www.financial-spread-betting.com/Sunk-cost.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2009). In poker 
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want the highest possible price, regardless of how much you paid for it. But 
appearances may be deceiving. Investors do not share the same information, 
and, as noted, we have to be careful about requiring the disclosure of 
private information that is costly to gather. One of the most sensitive pieces 
of information for any trader is her reservation price, as it reduces all of her 
private information to a single number. One of my best clues about how 
much you value an asset is the information that you, a sophisticated seller, 
bought the asset a minute ago for twenty dollars and are willing to sell it 
now for twenty-one dollars. I do not need to ask you anything about your 
private information as long as I can find out the price at which you are 
willing to buy and the price at which you are willing to sell. Claims in 
bankruptcy are no different from any other asset. Requiring a vulture 
investor to disclose the price at which she buys and sells a claim reveals her 
own estimate of its underlying value. At the limit, such a disclosure duty 
might have the same effect as a general duty to disclose. 
Disclosure brings with it a second cost as well. As mentioned earlier, 
firms in financial distress, especially today, possess capital structures that 
are badly fragmented. The bankruptcy exchange provides a mechanism that 
allows those who trade to consolidate the different pieces and make the 
ownership claims simpler and more coherent. Disclosure obligations can 
make this harder. The challenge is analogous to the one facing the real 
estate developer mentioned in Part I of this Article.54 Suppose the developer 
wants to reassemble an entire city block.55 Disclosing the plan in advance 
invites hold-outs who will refuse to sell simply to capture some of the 
benefits the developer hopes to earn by reunited fragmented pieces of 
land.56 One can argue that those who try to acquire substantial positions in 
the fulcrum security of a firm in Chapter 11 should be able to do so free of 
disclosure obligations.57 We should allow investors to build positions, just 
as we allow those who try to assemble city blocks not to reveal what they 
are doing. All standard critiques of the Williams Act apply with full force in 
the bankruptcy context.58 
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These objections to disclosure obligations, however, rest on the 
assumption that the underlying market is liquid. When the amount of 
trading that takes place in a given market is small, all bets are off. 
Distortions are possible. Prices may not reflect underlying values. For 
example, prices can rise or fall, not because of any underlying change in the 
true value of the firm, but because of an information mirage.59 A single 
trader mistakenly believes that another is trading on the basis of private 
information. She believes that the other has looked inside the black box 
when she has not. A third trader observes the first two trades, assumes that 
the second is not making a mistake, and draws an even stronger inference. 
An information cascade develops from just a small misstep. 
When markets are illiquid, one must also worry about manipulation. A 
trader known to have private information would appear at an exchange and 
conspicuously sell. Others would infer that the private information was bad 
news and would sell as well. The price would fall. At this point, 
confederates of the insider would begin to amass a huge position at the now 
artificially low price. When the private information becomes public 
information, the price rises far above the original level. The informed trader 
and his confederates enjoy an even larger profit than they would have had if 
he relied on his information without manipulating the market 
simultaneously. 
In the case of commodities contracts in the nineteenth century, the 
manipulation of most concern was the corner.60 A trader would secretly 
amass a huge portion of a particular contract (such as No. 2 soft red winter 
wheat for March delivery).61 At the same time, the trader would go long on 
the same commodity with short sellers.62 When the time came to deliver the 
wheat, the short sellers would not be able to acquire it because the trader 
would keep it off the market.63 The short sellers as a group would battle 
each other over the small amount that was actually available and the price 
would sky rocket.64 
The crucial, and largely unexplored, question is whether manipulations 
are possible on the bankruptcy exchange. Manipulation does not arise 
merely because a trader who knows an asset is undervalued tries to amass a 
large position at a low price. A trader who does this will, by virtue of her 
trading activity, raise the price. The trading activity pushes the price in the 
right direction. The price is never distorted in the sense that the trading 
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brings the market price closer to its true value. While the bankruptcy judge 
might need disclosure to do her job effectively or distort the plan formation 
process, disclosure is not necessary to ensure that the market functions 
effectively merely because someone is trading on the basis of inside 
information. But one can imagine investors acquiring different positions in 
different tranches with a view to misleading others and turning things to 
their advantage. 
In addition to the possibility of market manipulations, we need to worry 
about the way in which dispersed private information can undermine the 
liquidity of a market. One can imagine environments in which multiple 
parties possess private information, but none of them has an incentive to 
disclose what they know, even though each would be better off if everyone 
disclosed what they knew. Put differently, we face a collective action 
problem in which the individual benefits of disclosure are small, but the 
benefits of disclosure to the group as a whole are large. We face a trade-off 
between discouraging those with information from trading on it and 
ensuring that the market is sufficiently transparent that people will be 
willing to trade on it. It is axiomatic that the fewer the players, and the less 
active the trading, the less confident we can be that this will happen. 
Existing theories of market design do not offer many lessons about the 
liquidity/transparency trade-off.65 It may be that for the moment the best we 
can do is focus on the concrete. It may be possible to be more pointed in 
asking what information the judge needs to decide the questions before her 
and what information the parties need to know to be able to negotiate with 
each other, while at the same time being aware of the costs of disclosure, 
even of things that seem both irrelevant and innocuous. Making this balance 
and exercising discretion wisely is yet another burden we must place on the 
modern bankruptcy judge. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The bankruptcy forum has gone through dramatic evolution since the 
adoption of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978. It is no longer a sleepy place 
where traditional lenders and entrenched managers try to come to terms. In 
implementing the Bankruptcy Code, the modern bankruptcy judge creates a 
marketplace from scratch every time a large case is filed before her. 
Especially in a world of illiquidity, parties will assert—with greater or 
lesser degrees of credibility—that the judge’s decision to impose one set of 
rules or another will destroy either the firm or the marketplace for its 
securities. Insisting on coherent rules can make life hard for those who 
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make the most noise. In this world, the judge must resist the temptation to 
gravitate towards the decision that provides the easiest way to end the case. 
The smoothest path is not necessarily the one that promotes either the 
bankruptcy forum or the bankruptcy exchange. Until coherent norms 
emerge, the bankruptcy judge must seek out, as best she can, the most 
sensible set of regulations—including disclosure rules. Discovering these 
will bring the greatest rewards over the long run. 
